La Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo ha sancito che la mancata previsione, da parte dell'Irlanda, dell'aborto per ragioni di salute o benessere della donna non costituisce una violazione dell'art. 8 CEDU poiché, in assenza di consenso politico e scientifico fra gli Stati quanto all'inizio della vita, tale decisione rientra nel margine d'apprezzamento statale, la cui ampiezza è inversamente proporzionale rispetto al livello di consenso; costituisce una violazione degli obblighi positivi dello Stato ex art. 8 la mancata attuazione legislativa dell'art. 40 Cost. irlandese, il quale, nel riconoscere il diritto alla vita del nascituro, richiede che vengano fornite informazioni sui servizi disponibili, al fine di tutelare l'eguale diritto della madre.
Corte Europea dei Diritti dell'Uomo - A, B and C v. Ireland: aborto
16 dicembre 2010
La sentenza del 16 dicembre 2010 (ric. n. 25579/05 del 15 luglio 2005) della Corte di Strasburgo ha origine da tre ricorsi presentati nel 2005 da due donne irlandesi (A e B) e da una cittadina lituana, residente in Irlanda (C).
Vanno distinti i ricorsi di A e B da quello della terza donna: le prime due invocano una violazione degli articoli 3, 8, 13 e 14 della Convenzione, con riferimento alle restrizioni all'aborto nei casi di pregiudizio per la salute e il benessere della donna. Le doglianze di C, invece, si fondano non solo sulla violazione degli articoli richiamati dalle altre ricorrenti, ma anche sulla violazione dell'art. 2, in quanto la mancata attuazione in sede legislativa dell'art. 40.3.3° della Costituzione irlandese (in cui lo Stato riconosce il diritto ala vita del nascituro e, avendo riguardo all'eguale diritto alla vita della madre, ne garantisce il rispetto, senza limitare la libertà della donna di recarsi all'estero o di ottenere informazioni sui servizi disponibili in altri stati relativamente all'interruzione di gravidanza) non le permette di accertare il suo diritto ad abortire legalmente nel Paese, nonostante nel suo caso la gravidanza costituisse un rischio per la sua stessa vita.
Si riportano alcuni passi della sentenza (.pdf completo nel box dowload – fonte: HUDOC)
«231. The Court considers that the breadth of the margin of appreciation to be accorded to the State is crucial to its conclusion as to whether the impugned prohibition struck that fair balance. The Government maintained that, in the context of abortion laws, the State’s margin was significant and unaffected by any European or international consensus. The first and second applicants argued that, while a margin was to be accorded, the right to life of the unborn could not be accorded primacy to the exclusion of the proportionate protection of the rights of women and, further, that it was crucial to take account of the consensus outside of Ireland towards broader access to abortion».
«240. It is with this choice that the first and second applicants take issue. However, it is equally to this choice that the broad margin of appreciation centrally applies. The Court would distinguish the prohibition on the provision of information about abortion services abroad at issue in the Open Door case and the finding in that case that the prohibition on information was ineffective to protect the right to life because women travelled abroad anyhow (§ 76 of that judgment). There is, in the Court’s view, a clear distinction to be drawn between that prohibition and the more fundamental choice at issue in the present case as to the permitted grounds for lawful abortion in Ireland to which the above-described margin of appreciation is accorded.
241. Accordingly, having regard to the right to lawfully travel abroad for an abortion with access to appropriate information and medical care in Ireland, the Court does not consider that the prohibition in Ireland of abortion for health and well-being reasons, based as it is on the profound moral views of the Irish people as to the nature of life (paragraphs 222-227 above) and as to the consequent protection to be accorded to the right to life of the unborn, exceeds the margin of appreciation accorded in that respect to the Irish State. In such circumstances, the Court finds that the impugned prohibition in Ireland struck a fair balance between the right of the first and second applicants to respect for their private lives and the rights invoked on behalf of the unborn».
«264. The Court considers that the uncertainty generated by the lack of legislative implementation of Article 40.3.3, and more particularly by the lack of effective and accessible procedures to establish a right to an abortion under that provision, has resulted in a striking discordance between the theoretical right to a lawful abortion in Ireland on grounds of a relevant risk to a woman’s life and the reality of its practical implementation (Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], cited above, at §§ 77-78; and S. H. and Others v. Austria, cited above, at § 74. See also the Commissioner for Human Rights, paragraph 110 above)».
«266. As to the burden which implementation of Article 40.3.3 would impose on the State, the Court accepts that this would be a sensitive and complex task. However, while it is not for this Court to indicate the most appropriate means for the State to comply with its positive obligations (Marckx v. Belgium judgment, § 58; Airey v. Ireland judgment, § 26; and B. v. France, § 63, all cited above), the Court notes that legislation in many Contracting States has specified the conditions governing access to a lawful abortion and put in place various implementing procedural and institutional procedures (Tysiąc v. Poland judgment, § 123). Equally, implementation could not be considered to involve significant detriment to the Irish public since it would amount to rendering effective a right already accorded, after referendum, by Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution».
